State District Judge Pat Priest dismissed conspiracy charges against U.S. Rep. Tom DeLay and two political aides on Monday afternoon, but they could still face trial on charges of money laundering (all three men) and illegal use of corporate money in campaigns (DeLay's associates).`` A copy of Priest's order is available online in our Files section, at www.texasweekly.com/documents.The judge struck conspiracy charges against Colyandro and Ellis, but they still face charges of money laundering and making illegal political contributions. He dismissed a conspiracy charge against all three men, but left in place charges alleging money laundering against them. Priest said defendants' questions about prosecutorial misconduct might require a hearing; if the defense lawyers prevail there, it could result dismissal of the remaining charges against the three men. DeLay's lawyers, joined by lawyers for Jim Ellis and John Colyandro, two political aides to the Sugar Land Republican, have raised questions about how prosecutors worked with three separate grand juries in less than a week to produce the latest indictments. Also pending are defense motions to move the trial out of Travis County; they contend their chances of a fair trial have been poisoned by coverage of the investigation and by the anti-Republican political leanings of the county's residents. Priest, in an email to reporters, said the prosecutors have until December 20 to appeal his ruling if they wish to do so. In a written statement, prosecutors said they haven't decided on their next step. Lawyers for the defendants attacked the conspiracy charges early on, saying prosecutors were accusing their clients of breaking laws that weren't in effect at the time. Priest agreed with them and tossed those charges. But while he said there couldn't be charges of conspiracy to illegally use corporate money in an election, there were laws at the time restricting the use of corporate money in campaigns. Those charges, he left in place. And he laid out the charges much more plainly than the prosecutors have ever managed to do. "The Election Code by its express terms prohibits the giving or receiving of corporate funds for the purpose of financing a candidate's election effort... A person may not knowingly make or accept a political contribution in violation of Chapter 253... Therefore, a contribution intended by the corporation to be used for financing a candidate is unlawful. Likewise, if one solicits corporate contributions with an unlawful intent to divert the funds to a candidate a violation by the diverter occurs when the funds are actually so diverted, without regard to the intention of the corporate giver. Finally, if corporate contributions are received for a lawful purpose but subsequently diverted to an unlawful purpose, a violation of the election code occurs when the funds are so diverted and actually distributed to an individual candidate." Priest followed that with a footnote saying he's not in a position to judge the facts in this case, but is just laying out the substance of the charges. Prosecutors still have to prove any of that stuff happened. DeLay's lawyers contended that money moved around by Texans for a Republican Majority PAC was in the form of checks. The laws refer to funds, and they said there was a difference. Priest disagreed, and laid out what the prosecutors have to do to prove money-laundering charges: "If the State can prove that funds were obtained from corporate contributors by these defendants with the express intent of converting those funds to the use of individual candidates, or if the state can prove that these defendants entered into an agreement to convert the monies already on hand, though originally received for lawful purposes, to that use by sending the money to the Republican National State Elections Committee with an agreement that funds of the same amount would then be made available by that committee to individual candidates for Texas political office, and can prove that funds in the same amount were in fact contributed to individual candidates by the Republican National State Elections Committee, then they will have established that money was laundered. The money would have become "dirty money? at the point that it began to be held with the prohibited intent. Of course, if the state cannot establish that beyond a reasonable doubt, then the defendants will be entitled to be acquitted." Priest then went through an array of cases that spell out just what is and is not money laundering. In one, he flagged an argument that's been made in defense of what TRMPAC and the RNSEC did in 2002: "Incidentally, the court [in one of the cases cited] also held that the fact that dirty money is commingled with other, non-dirty money does not prohibit a finding of money laundering." One defense offered in this case is that transactions mentioned in the indictments were only a part of the business between the state and national political organizations. In the indictments, the men are accused of accepting $190,000 in corporate contributions which they then sent to the RNSEC, which then contributed the same amount -- in non-corporate money -- to seven candidates for the Texas House of Representatives.